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The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) has been implicated in studies of both executive and social
functions. Recent meta-analyses suggest that vlPFC plays an important but little understood role in
Theory of Mind (ToM). Converging neuropsychological and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) evidence suggests that this may reﬂect inhibition of self-perspective. The present study adapted
an extensively published ToM localizer to evaluate the role of vlPFC in inhibition of self-perspective. The
classic false belief, false photograph vignettes that comprise the localizer were modiﬁed to generate high
and low salience of self-perspective. Using a factorial design, the present study identiﬁed a behavioural
and neural cost associated with having a highly salient self-perspective that was incongruent with the
representational content. Importantly, vlPFC only differentiated between high versus low salience of self-
perspective when representing mental state content. No difference was identiﬁed for non-mental re-
presentation. This result suggests that different control processes are required to represent competing
mental and non-mental content.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Considerable effort has been directed towards determining the
roles of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) in Theory of Mind (ToM; for reviews see Carrington
and Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007; Mar, 2011; Schurz et al., 2014;
Spreng et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). Quantitative meta-
analyses, however, suggest consistent recruitment of several, less
examined, regions including the amygdala, precuneus and ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), across a multiplicity of para-
digms (see Bzdok et al., 2012; Mar, 2011; Schurz et al., 2014;
Spreng et al., 2009). The vlPFC in particular, and more speciﬁcally
the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), has been described as a pos-
sible candidate for part of the “core mentalizing network” (Mar,
2011, p.124); however, the functional proﬁle of vlPFC in ToM has
been largely unexamined.
Developmental studies provide considerable evidence that
both children and adults have difﬁculty with representing certain
ToM states, in terms of suspending self-perspective in favour of
someone else's, or selecting from competing perspectives (Birch
and Bloom, 2004, 2007; Carlson and Moses, 2001; German and15
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(C.E. Hartwright).Hehman, 2006). This difﬁculty can be attributed to the propensity
to automatically compute other people's viewpoints, even when
we need not (e.g., see Ramsey et al., 2013), and the associated
executive processes that accompany managing this. An increasing
literature suggests that vlPFC may play a key part in aiding se-
lection between self- and other perspectives. For example, Vogeley
et al. (2001) identiﬁed that right vlPFC was recruited when par-
ticipants were required to feature as an agent in a story, whilst
making a ToM judgement about a further character in the story.
This was suggested to reﬂect an executive process that was re-
quired in the instance of taking someone else's perspective, whilst
having to integrate this with their self-perspective. In a single case
study of a patient with right frontal damage including right vlPFC,
Samson et al. (2005) demonstrated that the patient's success in
passing a false belief task was dependent on whether their own
knowledge conﬂicted with that of the agent. In this study, the
patient completed two versions of the classic unexpected transfer
task. In both versions, the participant had to determine an agent's
belief as to the location of an object which, in the absence of that
agent, was transferred from its original location to a new location.
Samson's adaptation of the task meant that the ﬁrst version fol-
lowed a typical format, where the patient was aware of where the
object was moved from and to. This condition carried high in-
hibitory demands as the patient had to suppress their own con-
ﬂicting knowledge of where the object really was, in favour of the
agent's outdated viewpoint. In a novel, low inhibition version ofunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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but was blind to its location, therefore reducing competition be-
tween the two knowledge states. This patient's difﬁculty with the
typical, high inhibition false belief task was suggested to reﬂect
their inability to resist interference from self-perspective, not a
ToM deﬁcit as such. Using a modiﬁed version of the Samson et al.
(2005) task, van der Meer et al. (2011) collected fMRI data from
neurologically intact adults whilst they watched false belief sce-
narios designed to make high versus low inhibitory demands. The
same participants also completed a classic Go/No-Go task. In high
versus low inhibition scenarios, frontal activation was limited to
bilateral vlPFC and dorsal mPFC. Similarly, No-Go versus Go trials
elicited bilateral vlPFC. Common to high4 low inhibition and No-
Go4Go was left lateral PFC and right vlPFC. These data led the
authors to conclude that inhibition of self-perspective is mediated
by bilateral vlPFC when supporting a functioning ToM. Along a
similar vein, Rothmayr et al. (2011) asked participants to identify
whether an agent looked for the transferred object in a location
that was expected, given their true or false belief about its loca-
tion. They used the same pictorial stimuli to create a separate,
novel Go/No-Go task. Contrast masking analyses identiﬁed that a
largely left lateralised network, including left IFG and the wider
lateral PFC, was recruited exclusively in false4true belief versus
No-Go4Go trials. A conjunction between the false4true belief
and No-Go4Go identiﬁed right dorsal mPFC and dorsolateral PFC
bilaterally, plus bilateral TPJ and other regions outside of the PFC.
On the basis of common neural recruitment during the ToM and
inhibitory control tasks, the authors conclude that TPJ, dorsal
medial- and lateral PFC support domain general processes com-
mon to both ToM and executive control. What is particularly in-
teresting here, however, is that left IFG responded preferentially to
conﬂict in ToM, over a more classical motor-inhibition task. In line
with Mar (2011), Spreng et al. (2009), Samson et al. (2005) and
Vogeley et al. (2001), this provides a further suggestion that vlPFC
serves a role in response inhibition that is speciﬁc to ToM
The evidence reviewed suggests that the use of ToM is medi-
ated by executive control. Deﬁning a precise role for inhibition in
ToM, however, is complicated by the different elements of control
that are required for some, but not all, mental representation
tasks. For example, executive control is required for the un-
expected transfer task in order to direct a response away from the
target object, whether that is because the protagonist falsely be-
lieves it to be somewhere else, or because they have a desire to
avoid the object. As a result, an amount of control is required to
direct executive selection resources. Similarly, executive control is
also necessary when a perspective difference exists between self-
and other, such as is the case for false belief. Here, control is re-
quired to resolve differences between the content of a re-
presentation – own belief versus their belief – as opposed to the
contextual features – the true location versus the “false” location
or the desired versus the undesired outcome. Hartwright et al.
(2012) demonstrated neurocognitive differences between mental
representation which required inhibition of a competing con-
textual feature, such as when switching from one location to an-
other, against representing a mental state which required inhibi-
tion of a competing perspective. Representing mental states which
contained differing contextual features, but not perspective dif-
ferences, drew on a number of regions associated with executive
function including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), whereas re-
presenting mental states which featured both differing contextual
features and perspective differences additionally drew on vlPFC.
Thus, lateral prefrontal and medial prefrontal cortices work to-
gether to direct selection and resolve competition (Paus, 2001),
but the recruitment of either was dependent on the nature of the
representational task. Importantly, the manipulation in Hartwright
et al. (2012) illustrates that vlPFC and not midline control regionssuch as ACC, was speciﬁcally involved in resolving competing
perspectives, which is of primary interest here.
Whilst a role for vlPFC in self-perspective inhibition emerges
from the existing literature, little is known about how this region
responds to conﬂict caused by variation in perspectives within
mental and other, structurally matched, non-mental representa-
tion tasks. Contrasting brain activation associated with mental
versus non-mental representation has, however, been a frequent
approach to examine ToM (e.g., see review Carrington and Bailey,
2009). The present study therefore sought to examine the role of
vlPFC, speciﬁcally in the inhibition of self-perspective, during
mental (ToM, i.e., belief) and non-mental (non-ToM, i.e., physical)
representation. The present study comprises a simple manipula-
tion to an extensively published ToM localizer task, created by
Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) (e.g., see Aichhorn et al., 2009; Hart-
wright et al., 2012; Mitchell, 2007; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe and
Powell, 2006; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009). In the
original localizer task, neural activation resulting from reasoning
about an agent with a false belief (ToM) is contrasted with that
from reasoning about a closely matched, non-mental representa-
tion scenario, such as a false photograph or video (non-ToM). This
approach is argued to isolate brain regions that might be specia-
lised for ToM. For the present study, the localizer task was mod-
iﬁed to include vignettes which feature high and low salience of
self-perspective. This contrasts with the original localizer, where
self-perspective was generally highly salient. The novel task
comprised an orthogonal design whereby representation (belief/
physical) and salience of self-perspective (high/low) were ma-
nipulated within a single, within-subjects experiment. This fac-
torial design enabled a whole brain analysis to isolate any neural
regions that were modulated either by the form of representation
required, the salience of self-knowledge, or both. Following on
from the quantitative reviews by Spreng et al. (2009) and Mar
(2011), alongside neuropsychological evidence from Samson et al.
(2005), and neuroimaging data from Vogeley et al. (2001), Roth-
mayr et al. (2011) and van der Meer et al. (2011), of speciﬁc in-
terest was vlPFC, particularly within IFG. It was anticipated that
vlPFC would be modulated on the basis of high versus low salience
of self-perspective, as a result of the need to inhibit the competing
self-perspective.2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from a University wide Research
Participation Scheme. All self-reported that they had not been
diagnosed with any social, cognitive or neurological disorder.
Twenty one right-handed adults (12 female; age range 19–28, X¯
age¼22 years) participated in exchange for a small honorarium.
The Wide Range Achievement Test – Third Edition (WRAT-3)
Reading Scale was administered prior to taking part in the ex-
periment to ensure reading proﬁciency commensurate with the
task.
2.2. Materials and procedure
The task was based substantially on a localizer procedure de-
vised by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), where the core change was
the inclusion of additional vignettes. Stimuli were based on a
modiﬁed and expanded selection of the localizer stories (Saxe and
Andrews-Hanna, n.d.). All of the vignettes were rated for ease of
understanding and trialled on a separate group of individuals prior
to running the fMRI experiment. Participants read a total of 56
short vignettes which referred to either a mental representation
Table 1
Example vignettes.
Representation Salience of self-perspective
High Low
Mental (belief) Lorraine dashed out the
door and mistakenly left her
lunch money on the side
table. Thinking it was for a
school trip, her daughter put
the money upstairs in her
purse.
Liz hurried out the door and
mistakenly left her coffee
money on the desk. Think-
ing it was for his school
lunches, her son put the
money away in the usual
safe place.
Lorraine expects to ﬁnd her
lunch money in her daugh-
ter’s purse.
Liz expects to ﬁnd her coffee
money on the desk.
True False True False
Non-mental
(physical)
The speed camera captured
an image of the bright red
car as it sped along the road.
The following day, the car
was painted a grey colour
and the number plates were
changed.
The trafﬁc camera snapped
an image of the dark blue
car as it jumped the trafﬁc
lights. The following day,
the car was painted a bright
colour and the number
plates were changed.
According to the speed
camera image, the car is
bright red.
According to the trafﬁc
camera image, the car is a
bright colour.
True False True False
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presentation (physical), such as a false photograph, video or
painting (see Zaitchik (1990)). In order to modulate neural regions
that support self-perspective inhibition, following a theoretically
similar approach to Samson et al. (2005), the original vignettes
were modiﬁed so that the salience of the participant's perspective
– the information describing the true state of affairs – was sys-
tematically varied from high to low. Each belief vignette and each
physical vignette had a high and low salience version where the
contents and structure were closely matched; see Table 1. In high
salience vignettes, the occurrence and precise nature of the change
of state was made explicit; thus, the viewer held a highly salient
perspective on reality. The resulting striking incongruence be-
tween participants' own, self-perspective and the representational
perspective was anticipated to cause considerable interference
when adopting the false, representational perspective, resulting in
behavioural and neural consequences (Birch and Bloom, 2004;
Birch and Bloom, 2007). In low salience vignettes, the occurrence
of the change of state was still made explicit; however, the precise
nature of reality was less clearly-speciﬁed, making the viewer's
perspective of the true state of affairs less salient. It is important to
highlight that incongruence between the representational and real
state of affairs is again present although, this time, incompatibility
between the participant’s perspective and the state of reality was
intended to be less vivid. As a consequence, it was expected that
participants would suffer less interference from their own
knowledge point when adopting the false, representational
perspective.
The paradigm comprised a 22 repeated measures design
with two within-subjects factors, representation (belief/physical
(B/P)) and salience of self-perspective (high/low (H/L)), collapsed
into four equally occurring conditions: BH, BL, PH, PL. Each vign-
ette was displayed in black Arial point 22 font, presented on a grey
background. Experimental timings reﬂected the original localizer
task in Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). A single trial comprised a short
story, displayed for 10 s, followed for 4 s by a true or false question
about the preceding story. This required participants to make a
response using a two button box that was placed in their left hand,where the left button was always used to indicate a true state-
ment. The experiment contained an equal number of true/false
responses, which were randomised across the experiment. Stories
alternated between belief and physical and were interleaved with
a 13.5 s rest period comprising a ﬁxation dot. The presentation of
high versus low salience was pseudo randomised to prevent more
than three repetitions of either saliency variant, and pairs of high/
low stories were not repeated within the same block. The word
lengths of each type of vignette were equivalent (belief versus
physical representation t(23)¼0.073, p¼0.943; high versus low
salience t(23)o0.001, p¼1.000).
The experiment comprised four blocks of 12 trials of interest,
each containing three vignettes of from each condition. This re-
sulted in 12 trials for each of the four conditions. Participants
completed four practise trials immediately prior to scanning to
orientate themselves with the task. Each block also contained a
further two randomly placed anti-strategy trials. Whilst the
structure of the story element in these anti-strategy vignettes was
identical to the trials of interest, the question phase required
participants to answer a true/false question about the true out-
come described within the vignette. This prevented participants
from adopting a formulaic approach to response preparation (Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003).
2.3. Data acquisition and preprocessing
The data were acquired during a single session using a 3T
Philips Achieva scanner, with an 8 channel head coil. The stimuli
were presented using Presentation software (v. 14.1; Neurobeha-
vioral Systems, CA), which also recorded the behavioural response
data simultaneously. 159 T2n-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI)
volumes were obtained per block of the experiment, each of which
consisting of 42 axial slices obtained consecutively in a bottom up
sequence, reconstructed voxel size¼333 mm3. Whole brain
coverage was achieved with a TR¼2.5 s, TE¼35 ms, acquisition
matrix¼9696, ﬂip angle¼83°, SENSE factor¼2, voxel size¼3
33 mm3. High resolution T1-weighted structural images were
acquired following collection of the functional data (3D TFE, sa-
gittal orientation, TR¼8.4 ms, TE¼3.8, 175 slices, reconstructed
voxel size¼111 mm3).
Preprocessing and statistical analyses of the data were per-
formed using the FMRIB software library (FSL version v.4.1.9;
FMRIB, Oxford, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl; FEAT version 5.98). Initial
preprocessing of the functional data consisted of slice timing and
motion correction using rigid body transformations (MCFLIRT;
Jenkinson et al., 2002). The blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
signals were high-pass ﬁltered using a Gaussian weighted ﬁlter of
21 s. The BOLD data were then spatially smoothed using a 5 mm
full-width-half-maximum kernel. The functional data were regis-
tered to their respective structural images and transformed to a
standard template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) reference brain, using a 7-DoF linear transformation (FLIRT;
Jenkinson and Smith, 2001; Jenkinson et al., 2002).
2.4. fMRI data analysis
Four explanatory variables (EVs) of interest – BH, BL, PH, PL –
were modelled to reﬂect the four experimental conditions. Each
EV comprised the story and question phase of a single vignette
(14 s). Each EV was convolved with a gamma derived hemody-
namic response function (HRF) within a general linear model
(GLM) framework. The anti-strategy trials and motion parameters
were modelled as regressors of no interest. Consistent with prior
application of the localizer, all trials were modelled regardless of
response accuracy. Higher level modelling was used to aggregate
the data across participants and experimental runs within a mixed
Fig. 1. Mean percentage of errors made per condition. Error rates calculated across
the whole experiment. BH¼1.85%; BL¼0.93%; PH¼2.55%; PL¼0.69%. Error bars
reﬂect þ/1 SE of the mean.
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was computed to replicate the original localizer contrast belief4
physical, as per Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). To determine whether
vlPFC is modulated by varying demands in inhibition of self-per-
spective, further modelling reﬂected a 22 repeated measures
ANOVA with representation (B/P) and salience of self-perspective
(H/L) as within subjects factors. As the factorial analysis does not
provide directional information about any identiﬁed neural re-
lationship, a quadrupled t-test was also computed using the same
parameters for planned contrasts: BH4BL, BL4BH, PH4PH and
PL4PL. These contrasts were speciﬁed a priori to address the
questions of interest. In the conﬁrmatory analyses of the belief4
physical contrast, as computed by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), the
resulting Z statistic images were thresholded using a cluster based
approach, where Z42.3, cluster pcorro0.001. For the later factorial
and directional analyses, the resulting Z statistic images were
thresholded with Z42.3, cluster pcorro0.05. In addition to con-
ducting whole brain analyses, given our strong a priori hypothesis,
and due to the published statistical challenges in identifying
neural regions that support complex cognitive functions (Lieber-
man and Cunningham, 2009), pre-threshold masking was used to
constrain these analyses to bilateral vlPFC. This was deﬁned as
comprising ventrolateral voxels in Brodmann Areas 44, 45 and 47
which had a Z20% probability of falling within either IFG, the
frontal operculum or frontal orbital cortices, as classiﬁed by the
Harvard-Oxford cortical atlas. Results are described according to
gross anatomical regions and anterior, mid and posterior vlPFC,
approximating BA 47, 45 and 44 respectively (Badre and Wagner,
2007). Mean percent signal change plots of each effect identiﬁed
by the GLM analyses were created using FSL's Featquery. This
enabled a closer examination of how the data contribute to each
result (Poldrack and Mumford, 2009).3. Results
3.1. Behavioural data
The participants' error rates were analysed in a 22 repeated
measures ANOVA, with representation (B/P) and salience of self-
perspective (H/L) as within subjects factors1 (Fig. 1). Overall, few
incorrect responses were made. Whilst, across the whole experi-
ment, participants made numerically fewer errors when making a
belief inference versus when making a physical representation
judgment, factorial analysis found no signiﬁcant effect of re-
presentation (F(1,17)¼0.46, p¼0.51, η2¼0.03). Almost three times
as many errors were made when self-perspective was highly
salient, which was supported by a signiﬁcant main effect of sal-
ience (F(1,17)¼10.07, p¼0.006, η2¼0.37). Post hoc comparisons
conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant difference in the number of errors made in
high versus low salience (high4 low; SE¼0.44, p¼0.006). Parti-
cipants were generally most error prone when making a physical
representation judgment and their self-perspective highly salient;
however, there was no statistically signiﬁcant interaction between
representation and salience in error rate (F(1,17)¼2.69, p¼0.12,
η2¼0.14). Inspection of the error rate for anti-strategy trials de-
termined that the participants were generally performing at ceil-
ing, and thus were not ignoring presented information strategi-
cally (mean frequency correct 7.23/8. SD 0.89).1 Due to an equipment failure, behavioural data from 3 participants were un-
available. These participants were included in subsequent neuroimaging analyses
as their inclusion yielded no key differences in the localisation of effects in the raw,
unthresholded data.3.2. Neuroimaging data
3.2.1. Conﬁrmatory analyses
Conﬁrmatory analyses of the belief4physical contrast, as
computed by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), identiﬁed regions con-
sistent with ToM and previously published uses of the localizer.
This included bilateral TPJ temporal poles, precuneus and mPFC
(Table 2; Fig. 2).
3.2.2. Novel task, whole brain analyses
A whole brain, 22 repeated measures ANOVA with re-
presentation (belief/physical (B/P)) and salience of self-perspective
(high/low (H/L)) as within subjects factors identiﬁed a main effect of
representation (B/P) in nine clusters of activation (Table 3; Sup-
plementary Table i). Manipulation of representation resulted in the
largest signal intensities within two large clusters centred on bi-
lateral TPJ. These clusters spanned the parietal and temporal lobes,
running in the rostral direction along the lateral and superior
temporal sulci to the temporal poles. The right lateralised of these
clusters also extended superiorly from the temporal pole to en-
compass vlPFC. Equally large intensity values were identiﬁed in a
posterior midline cluster which encompassed the posterior cingu-
late gyrus, extending in the superior direction to include bilateral
precuneus and left lingual gyrus. The largest cluster was centred on
bilateral frontal pole and extended laterally to both hemispheres to
include bilateral superior frontal and middle frontal gyri. A further
cluster was identiﬁed in left frontal cortex, which encompassed the
frontal pole and vlPFC, comprising inferior to middle frontal gyri.
Clusters also included bilateral occipital and cerebellar regions. No
main effect of salience of self-perspective (H/L) was identiﬁed.
However, a signiﬁcant interaction existed between the two main
factors in four clusters of activation. Here, the largest signal in-
tensities were in a left lateralised cluster comprising voxels in pre
and post central gyri. A second left lateralised cluster was identiﬁed
in vlPFC, encompassing inferior to middle frontal gyri. The largest
cluster centred on bilateral anterior cingulate cortex, extending to
the right hemisphere running posteriorly to include the para-
hippocampal gyrus and insular cortex. A further cluster centred on
right anterior lingual gyrus near the midline, crossing to the con-
tralateral hemisphere to include mostly left lateralised structures
including the parahippocampal gyrus, then extending towards the
lateral surface to include the temporal pole.
Planned contrasts, computed as a quadrupled t-test, identiﬁed
four clusters of activation where BH4BL and three clusters where
PL4PH (Table 3; Supplementary Table i). For belief representa-
tion, a largely left lateralised network, encompassing anterior
lateral and medial frontal regions, was more active for high versus
Table 2
Cluster peaks for conﬁrmatory whole brain analysis; belief4physical.
Cluster peak Hemi Brodmann area Cluster size (voxels) MNI coordinates Z-value
x y z
Temporoparietal junction R 21 1204 62 56 16 9.53
Precuneus L/R 7 2441 0 56 34 9.34
Temporoparietal junction L 21 767 54 56 22 8.35
Temporal Pole R 21 442 56 6 34 8.26
Middle temporal gyrus, anterior division L 20 318 54 0 36 8.25
Middle temporal gyrus, posterior division R 20 82 54 8 20 6.97
Frontal pole L 9 59 14 52 32 6.81
Frontal pole L/R 10 110 0 62 10 6.62
Cerebellum L N/A 33 28 80 40 6.59
Middle frontal gyrus R 9 20 28 26 34 6.44
Middle temporal gyrus, posterior division L 21 40 64 22 10 6.43
Middle temporal gyrus, posterior division R 21 16 66 26 10 6.19
Temporal pole L 20 2441 38 16 42 5.68
Note: Result reﬂects a two sample paired t-test, were neural regions listed were more responsive to belief (B) over physical (P) representation. Thresholded voxelwise at
pcorro0.001. Brodmann areas are approximate.
C.E. Hartwright et al. / Neuropsychologia 67 (2015) 183–192 187low salience of self-perspective. Left vlPFC showed the greatest
signal intensities, with activation concentrated around IFG. For
physical representation, a network of posterior, bilateral regions,
mainly limited to the parietal lobe, were more active for low
versus high salience of self-perspective. No neural regions were
identiﬁed by the contrasts BL4BH and PH4PL.
3.2.3. Novel task, region of interest analyses
For the main analysis within pre-deﬁned voxels of bilateral
vlPFC, a 22 repeated measures ANOVA identiﬁed a main effect of
representation (B/P) in bilateral vlPFC, where the peak activation
was centred on mid vlPFC, the IFG pars triangularis (IFGtr). This
cluster extends in the rostral direction to include a small portion of
the superior quadrant of anterior vlPFC, and in the caudal direction
towards the posterior boundary of the frontal poles. This main
effect was driven by a larger percentage signal change in physical
versus belief stimuli (Fig. 3A; D red shading). No main effect of
salience of self-perspective (H/L) was identiﬁed; however, a two-
way interaction identiﬁed a separate cluster which chieﬂy com-
prised left anterior vlPFC (Fig. 3B; D blue shading). This cluster
centred on the IFG pars orbitalis (IFGor) and extended in the su-
perior direction to encompass part of mid vlPFC, although this
activation was more posterior to the region modulated by the
main effect of representation. The signal plot in Fig. 3B and acti-
vation map in Fig. 3C together indicate that the interaction was
driven by an effect of salience when making a beliefFig. 2. Activation map for the contrast B4P overlaid onto the MNI brain template. Show
images. Lateral view shows right hemisphere to illustrate right TPJ.representation, where having a highly salient self-perspective re-
cruited more resources in vlPFC than when self-perspective was
less salient. The a priori planned contrasts provide further in-
formation for interpreting this interaction. Whilst there appears to
be a trend towards the opposite effect when representing non-
mental information, in fact the quadrupled t-tests found that the
effect of salience was only present during mental representation in
vlPFC. Thus, no other contrasts within this quadrupled t-test, in-
cluding physical high4physical low, survived cluster detection.
Voxels contributing to the signiﬁcant t-test for high versus low
salience when making a belief inference formed a single cluster,
which comprised left mid to anterior vlPFC (Fig. 3C; D green
shading). The cluster peak for this signiﬁcant contrast of belief
high4belief low was positioned in IFGtr extending in the caudal
direction to encompass voxels identiﬁed within the factorial ana-
lysis for the effect of representation (Fig. 3D yellow shading), and
in the ventral direction to include voxels identiﬁed by the factorial
interaction effect (Fig. 3D cyan shading). Table 4 details contrasts
performed in these analyses and the resulting cluster peaks.4. Discussion
Prior behavioural literature evidences children's and adults'
difﬁculty with certain ToM states, for example, when required to
suspend self-perspective in favour of someone else’s (Birch ands signiﬁcantly activated voxels where pcorro0.001. Images reﬂect Z-corrected t-stat
Table 3
Cluster peaks for whole brain, representation by salience analyses
Cluster peak Hemi Brodmann
area
Cluster
size (voxels)
MNI coordinates Z-value
x y z
2x2 Repeated Measures ANOVA
Main effect of Representation (B/P)
Temporoparietal junction R 21 8470 62 -56 16 8.21
Temporoparietal junction L 21 7706 -54 -56 22 8.21
Cingulate Gyrus, posterior division L 23 5794 -8 -54 26 8.21
Frontal Pole L 9 11084 -14 52 32 6.71
Inferior Temporal Gyrus, temporo-occipital part L 20 858 -52 -52 -16 6.21
Frontal Pole L 45 973 -44 40 4 5.07
Cerebellum R – 799 26 -80 -38 4.64
Cerebellum L – 1609 -20 -90 -44 4.24
Intracalcarine Cortex L 19 988 -24 -68 4 4.08
Main effect of Salience of Self-Perspective (H/L)
ns
Representation * Salience Interaction
Postcentral Gyrus L 3 950 -28 -38 40 4.17
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis L 48 671 -32 30 12 3.98
Cingulate Gyrus, anterior division R 24 1444 4 28 18 3.92
Lingual Gyrus R – 1205 10 -52 -8 3.85
Planned Contrasts (Quadrupled t-test)
BH 4 BL
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis L 48 2224 -32 30 14 4.54
Lingual Gyrus R – 808 8 -48 -2 4.00
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 8 945 -26 18 50 3.92
Temporal Fusiform Cortex, posterior division L 30 783 -24 -40 -18 3.74
BL 4 BH
ns
PH 4 PL
ns
PL 4 PH
Cingulate Gyrus, anterior division R – 2950 8 -6 44 4.31
Supramarginal Gyrus, anterior division R 2 1274 62 -30 30 4.29
Postcentral Gyrus L 48 900 -64 -18 18 3.80
Note. Results from ANOVA reﬂect regions identiﬁed using F-contrasts in a 2-way repeated measures factorial analysis with representation (belief/physical, B/P) and salience
of self-perspective (high/low, H/L) as within subjects factors. ANOVA results reﬂect cluster peaks for cortical regions which are modulated by varying representation status
(belief/physical) and salience status (high/low). Quadrupled t-test reﬂects planned contrasts within speciﬁc conditions of interest. Brodmann Areas are approximate. ns =
non-signiﬁcant at Z 4 2.3, pcorr o 0.05. B = belief, P = physical, H = high, L = low. Supplementary Table i additionally details anatomically unique local maxima for these
analyses.
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man, 2006). Converging evidence suggests that vlPFC, and IFG in
particular, plays an important part in ToM (Mar, 2011; Spreng et al.,
2009), where neuropsychological (Samson et al., 2005) and neu-
roimaging data (e.g., Hartwright et al., 2012; McCleery et al., 2011;
Rothmayr et al., 2011; van der Meer et al., 2011) indicate that this
role may reﬂect an inhibitory mechanism, such as would be re-
quired when selecting from competing sources of information like
self versus other perspectives. The present study aimed to clarify
the nature of inhibition supported by vlPFC, by manipulating how
salient participants' own perspectives were, within a single, re-
peated measures design. Using an extensively published ToM lo-
calizer task (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), we examined self-per-
spective inhibition in both mental and non-mental representation.
It was anticipated that systematic manipulation of salience of self-
perspective would modulate vlPFC, due to resulting varying levels
of interference from self-perspective.
In general, the participants performed with high accuracy in
mental and non-mental representation, as well as understanding
the real state of affairs. No behavioural effect of representation was
identiﬁed in terms of the number of errors made; thus, adultsshowed no behavioural cost between assuming a mental, versus a
physical, representation of an event. A signiﬁcant cost was, how-
ever, associated with judging the content of mental and non-
mental representations when under the inﬂuence of a highly
salient self-perspective. This corresponds with numerous beha-
vioural data which suggest that self-perspective interferes when
making judgments about a naive or misinformed other (see Birch
and Bloom, 2004; 2007 for a review). For example, the classic
unexpected transfer false belief task illustrates that children under
the age of four respond from their own, egocentric perspective
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Furthermore, adults tend to over-
estimate the extent to which own knowledge is shared by others,
in terms of the outcome of an event (Fischhoff, 2003) or general
knowledge (Thomas and Jacoby, 2013). Also adults, like children,
suffer interference from their own visual perspective when con-
sidering the viewpoint of an agent (Keysar et al., 2003; Surtees and
Apperly, 2012). Considered together, the behavioural data pre-
sented here add further credence to the view that holding an in-
compatible perspective with an agent, when realised, is necessa-
rily effortful. What is interesting to note at this point, however, is
that the participants’ behaviour was not sensitive to any
Fig. 3. Activation maps overlaid onto the MNI brain template show signiﬁcantly activated voxels where Z42.3, pcorro0.05. Images are displayed in neurological convention,
where left is represented on the left side of the image. Slices highlight cluster peaks. Plots reﬂect group mean percentage signal change in the highlighted cluster for each
condition; error bars reﬂect þ/1 SE of the mean (Panel A). Result from 22 repeated measures ANOVA, with Representation (B/P) and Salience (H/L) as within-subjects
factors. Image reﬂects a Z-corrected F-stat image of neural regions modulated by the factor of representation (B/P). Slices from left to right, z¼4, x¼44, x¼48 (Panel B).
Image reﬂects a Z-corrected F-stat image of regions modulated by an interaction between representation (B/P) and salience of self-perspective (H/L). Slices z¼10, x¼36
(Panel C). Image reﬂects a Z-corrected t-stat image following a quadrupled t-test where BH4BL. Slices z¼10, z¼44 (Panel D). Activation maps are rendered onto a
standard brain, showing the left vlPFC. Red shading indicates main factorial effect of Representation (B/P); dark blue indicates representation salience interaction; green
indicates signiﬁcant result from quadrupled t-test where BH4BL. Yellow indicates voxels recruited by both factor of representation (B/P) and quad t-test BH4BL; cyan
indicates voxels recruited by R S interaction and BH4BL t-test. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
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the neural measures, as will be outlined shortly, were sensitive to
this factor.
Whilst imperceptible on the basis of the behavioural data,
whole brain analyses suggested that different functional processes
were engaged following the salience manipulation for mental
versus physical representation. Consequently, no main effect of the
salience manipulation was identiﬁed. The absence of a brain-based
main effect may appear in conﬂict with the behavioural data, but
can be understood through the interaction effect revealed in the
fMRI analyses. This interaction, when considered alongside the
planned directional contrasts, demonstrated that the salience
manipulation modulated a frontal–lateral network during mental
representation, and midline frontal structures for physical re-
presentation. Thus, we conclude that different neural architectures
produced the similar behavioural output patterns, as has been
observed in many previous studies (see Wilkinson and Halligan,
2004 for a review). In the case of ToM, the present study provides
new evidence that, when reasoning about what someone else
believes, vlPFC is modulated by how salient one's own, self-per-
spective is, as greater demand on IFG was associated with re-
presenting the belief state of an agent when the participants' own,
competing self knowledge was highly salient. Notably, the neural
cost of high salience in vlPFC was only identiﬁed when making a
mental, but not a non-mental, representational judgement. Spe-
ciﬁcally, the neural interaction effect pinpointed left IFG asresponding differently to the salience manipulation for mental
versus physical representations. Planned contrasts using a quad-
rupled t-test conﬁrmed this was due to greater resource demand
for high versus low salience of self-perspective in belief reasoning,
whereas no difference between high or low salience of self-per-
spective was identiﬁed in vlPFC when reasoning about outdated
non-mental content, such as photographs, videos and paintings.
Importantly, a whole brain analysis, using the approach speciﬁed
in Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), conﬁrmed that the modiﬁcations
outlined in the present paradigm had not altered the performance
of the localizer. Thus, when contrasting beliefs with physical re-
presentation as per the original localizer, the task identiﬁed brain
areas similar to those in previous studies, in particular TPJ and
mPFC. However, the inclusion of novel stimuli and analyses
showed an interaction between the type of representation (mental
versus non-mental) and how salient self-perspective was in vlPFC.
Taken together, the data presented here extend the set of brain
regions responding differentially to the contrast between false
belief and false photograph stimuli, which have been consistently
identiﬁed in previous research (e.g., Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Scholz
et al., 2009). Below we consider alternative interpretations of
these ﬁndings.
The rationale for the development of Saxe and colleagues' false
belief versus false photograph contrast was to identify brain areas
that were selectively active when reasoning about mental states
(Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). Following this reasoning, the natural
Table 4
Cluster peaks for representation by salience analyses within pre-deﬁned vlPFC mask.
Cluster peak Hemi Brodmann area Cluster size (voxels) MNI coordinates Z-value
x y z
22 Repeated measures ANOVA
Main effect of representation
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis L 45 605 44 40 4 5.07
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis R 45 280 48 40 10 4.11
Main effect of salience of self-perspective
ns
Representation salience interaction
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars orbitalis L 47 246 36 30 10 4.49
Planned contrasts (quadrupled t-test)
BH4BL
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis L 45 669 44 38 10 4.38
BL4BH
ns – – – – – – –
PH4PL
ns – – – – – – –
PL4PH
ns – – – – – – –
Note: Results from ANOVA reﬂect regions identiﬁed using F-contrasts in a 2-way repeated measures factorial analysis with representation (belief/physical, B/P) and salience
of self-perspective (high/low, H/L) as within subjects factors. ANOVA results reﬂect cluster peaks for cortical regions within vlPFC masked region which were modulated by
varying representation status (belief/physical) and salience status (high/low) quadrupled t-test reﬂects planned contrasts within speciﬁc conditions of interest. Brodmann
areas are approximate. ns¼non-signiﬁcant at Z42.3, pcorro0.05. B¼belief, P¼photo, H¼high, L¼ low.
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speciﬁc brain region associated with an inhibitory demand during
mentalising but not an equivalent inhibitory demand in a non-
mentalising context. However, we do not favour this conclusion,
for two reasons. Firstly, executive functions, such as inhibition, are
typically viewed as domain-general by deﬁnition (e.g., Miyake
et al., 2000), and this view is supported by a wealth of evidence
suggesting that executive demands of diverse tasks are met by
drawing upon the same pool of executive resources (e.g., Miller
and Cohen, 2001). Secondly, the particular brain region identiﬁed
in the present study – left IFG – is frequently implicated in diverse
non-social tasks that make inhibitory demands (e.g., Badre and
Wagner, 2007; Moss et al., 2005; Swick et al., 2008), reducing the
likelihood that the present results correspond to domain-speciﬁc
processes.
A second interpretation of the selective effect of our salience
manipulation for representation of mental states is that it is an
artefact of inadequate matching between our mental representa-
tion and non-mental representation stimuli. For example, Callejas
et al. (2011) suggested that the original false belief and false
photograph localizer vignettes used by Saxe and colleagues make
different demands on working memory and employ different lin-
guistic structures, which might be sufﬁcient to explain away the
difference in neural activation for these two classes of stimuli. Left
IFG has been implicated in the integration of semantic information
in text and, thus, could lead to the view that the present results
reﬂect differing linguistic complexity (Hagoort, 2005). The design
of the present task, however, does not favour this explanation for
the ﬁndings presented here. In the present study, no evidence was
found for a behavioural difference between stories with mental
and non-mental representational content, although the low ob-
served error rates lead us to make this assertion cautiously. Inaddition, all of the vignettes were rated for ease of understanding
on a separate sample of participants and both these ratings, and
the word lengths of each type of vignette were equivalent.
Moreover, concerns in the literature about spurious differences
between mental- and non-mental vignettes correspond to the
high-inhibition vignettes used in the present study, which yielded
no difference in activity in left vlPFC. The effect in left vlPFC was an
interaction between the representation and salience conditions,
which planned contrasts highlighted was driven by a neural dif-
ference between high versus low salience of self-perspective in
belief reasoning. Thus, it was the salience manipulation within the
ToM condition that modulated vlPFC, not a feature of difference
between mental and non-mental representation per se. It is im-
portant to reiterate that the structure of the high/low belief rea-
soning vignettes were identical (as were high/low for physical);
each high salience vignette had a matched low salience version.
Thus, we do not believe that our distinctive results in vlPFC are due
to incidental differences between the classes of vignette used.
Our favoured interpretation is that belief and photo stimuli are
indeed not perfectly matched in their executive demands, but for
the theoretically important reason that while both false beliefs and
false photographs contain different content from the new state of
reality, only false beliefs are “about” reality (Perner et al., 2006;
Sabbagh et al., 2006). This “aboutness” relation is a critical feature
of mental representations such as beliefs, and a narrow class of
other non-mental representations, such as signs, and it is this
aboutness relation that allows beliefs in our scenarios to be con-
sidered “false” representations of the updated situation, whereas
the photographs are more correctly described as accurate re-
presentations of an outdated situation. Our data suggest that this
aboutness relationship between belief and reality meant that
manipulation of the salience of reality in the belief vignettes
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presentation of belief and reality, resulting in differential recruit-
ment of inhibitory resources in the high- versus low-salience
vignettes. In contrast, the absence of this aboutness relationship in
the photograph vignettes meant that manipulation of the salience
of reality had no effect. Thus, the effect we observe in vlPFC is not
the recruitment of a domain-speciﬁc resource, nor is it an artefact
of poorly-controlled stimuli; it is the recruitment of domain-gen-
eral inhibitory resources in response to a theoretically important
feature of beliefs that is not shared with photographs, videos and
drawings.
Although the present study provides signiﬁcant progress in
understanding the role of vlPFC in ToM, important questions re-
main. Whereas the present study indicated a left lateralised pro-
cess for the inhibition of self-perspective, a parallel literature has
implicated right (Samson et al., 2005; Vogeley et al., 2001) or bi-
lateral vlPFC (van der Meer et al., 2011). Although the laterality of
our data are in line with a quantitative meta analysis of ToM (Mar,
2011), additional research is needed to determine if, and how, right
vlPFC works in conjunction with left vlPFC to support inhibitory
processes in ToM, particularly as left and right vlPFC are thought to
support different, but related, mechanisms in inhibitory control
(O'Reilly, 2010). The present data speak to an account of vlPFC
where the left hemisphere supports controlled retrieval and the
right plays a more general role in suppressing irrelevant informa-
tion. Speciﬁcally, the experimental manipulation presented here
varied the level of salience of self-perspective, rather than the
presence of it. All conditions therefore contained two competing
sources of information: a representational and real state of affairs.
As right vlPFC is suggested to suppress irrelevant informational
items (Aron et al., 2004) – which was an equal requirement across
all of the experimental conditions presented here – right vlPFC
would not be identiﬁed by the analyses that could be performed on
the present data. Left vlPFC, conversely, has been shown to be in-
volved in controlling the retrieval of competing informational
items, working in conjunction with semantic information areas,
such as the temporal poles (Badre et al., 2005; Badre and Wagner,
2007), which were recruited alongside left IFG in the whole brain
interaction effect. In the case of ToM, the temporal poles may ac-
cess semantic knowledge for ToM. Importantly, a natural pro-
pensity towards our own perspective (Birch and Bloom, 2004;
2007) suggests that “self” may serve as one source of reference
in situations of limited knowledge. Self-perspective in this case,
however, is not informative. Thus, by varying the salience of own
perspective, this latter process of left IFG working with the tem-
poral poles could be facilitated, wherein other, relevant semantic
knowledge for ToM, beyond “self”, can be retrieved. A direct test of
this hypothesised relationship between the left IFG and temporal
poles in the context of mentalising would be a valuable topic for
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